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                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No.  17-2604 
   
  
LEXPATH TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS, INC., 





BRIAN WELCH; WELCH TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, LLC 
        
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  3-13-cv-05379) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
      
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on April 17, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 30, 2018) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P.  5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Defendant-Appellee, Brian Welch, left his employment as a network engineer with 
Lexpath Holdings, Inc. (“Lexpath”) to form his own company, Welch Technology 
Services, LLC (“WTS”).  Lexpath sued Welch and WTS contending that, among other 
things, Welch misappropriated trade secrets and confidential information. The jury found 
for Welch and WTS on all counts.  On appeal, Lexpath raises a plethora of issues, 
challenging several of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of summary 
judgment in its favor, as well as the jury’s verdict.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
Welch worked for Lexpath as a network engineer.  He did not sign a non-compete 
or non-disclosure agreement with Lexpath.  During his employment there, Welch 
serviced three primary clients: Liberty Transportation Group (“Liberty”), EIMC, LLC 
(“EIMC”), and Mental Health Association of New Jersey (“MHANJ”).  
Welch left Lexpath on August 2, 2013.  However, before resigning, he took 
several steps to establish his new business, WTS.  Welch officially formed WTS on June 
21, 2013.  On July 24, 2013, Welch spoke to his business contacts at Liberty, informing 
them of his intentions to leave Lexpath and form WTS.  Liberty requested a rate sheet 
from Welch, which he provided on July 31, 2013.  Moreover, on August 1, 2013, Welch 
spoke with his contact at EIMC about leaving Lexpath and forming WTS.  However, all 
of Welch’s other contact with EIMC was done after he left Lexpath.  Finally, in his last 
week of employment with Lexpath, Welch informed an administrative assistant at 
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MHANJ, Katie Koskie, of his intention to leave Lexpath.  On August 2, 2013, Welch told 
one of Lexpath’s principals, Martin Tuohy, that he was resigning and starting WTS.  
Welch told Tuohy that he solicited business from Liberty and EIMC, and he thought they 
would likely leave Lexpath for WTS.  Within a few days of Welch’s resignation, Liberty 
and EIMC moved their business to WTS.   
After Welch’s resignation on August 2, 2013, he kept his work laptop, which he 
had also used for personal use.  Welch used the laptop after his resignation, but the 
parties dispute whether he had permission to do so.  On August 6, 2013, Lexpath’s 
counsel sent Welch a letter outlining the claims that Lexpath was considering bringing 
against Welch and WTS.  Shortly thereafter, on August 13, 2013, Lexpath’s counsel 
contacted Welch to inform him that Lexpath intended to initiate litigation, and to request 
the return of the laptop.  Welch returned the laptop, through counsel, about seven months 
later.  
For litigation support, Lexpath retained the services of Digital4NX to investigate 
whether there was misappropriation of trade secrets and other confidential information.  
On August 13, 2013, the same day that Lexpath told Welch it would sue, Welch ran a 
program called CCleaner on the laptop to permanently delete files.  Upon examining the 
laptop, Digital4NX discovered that approximately 54,000 files had been deleted.  
However, the forensic expert testified that he could not determine what types of data had 
been deleted from the laptop.   




 On September 9, 2013, Lexpath filed suit against Welch and WTS.  In its 
complaint, Lexpath stated the following nine claims: (1) violation of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA) (18 U.S.C. § 1030); (2) breach of duty of loyalty; (3) 
misappropriation of trade secrets; (4) unfair competition; (5) breach of the duty of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage; (7) disparagement; (8) violation of New Jersey Trade Secrets Act 
(N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:15-1 to -9 (West 2012)); and (9) violation of the New Jersey 
Computer Related Offenses Act (“CROA”) (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:38A-1 (West 2010)).  
Welch and WTS then counterclaimed seeking an award of damages for attorneys’ fees 
and costs incurred in defending against the trade secrets claim, arguing it was made in 
bad faith.   
 Following the completion of discovery, Lexpath moved for summary judgment 
and spoliation sanctions in connection with Welch’s handling of the laptop.  In support of 
its motion, Lexpath submitted affidavits from Peter Reganato and Alan Feldman 
repeating statements made by Liberty’s president, Donald Lusardi, that Welch had made 
negative remarks to him about Lexpath.1  The District Court granted Welch’s motion to 
exclude Reganato and Feldman’s testimony as inadmissible double hearsay.  The Court 
also entered an order (“Spoliation Order”) granting Lexpath’s motion for spoliation, 
holding that it would “instruct the jury that they may presume that the lost information 
was unfavorable to Defendants.” A. 1724.11 (emphasis added).  
                                              
1 The District Court later denied Lexpath’s motion for reconsideration of this ruling.  
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 Lexpath renewed its motion for summary judgment on the basis of “new facts 
adduced at the spoliation hearing.”  A. 2786.  The District Court denied the motion, 
noting the overwhelming number of material facts at issue.  Moreover, it noted that any 
factual determinations made in the Spoliation Order were solely for the purpose of 
spoliation sanctions and were not binding on the jury, nor did they take any issues away 
from the jury.     
 Before trial, Lexpath moved for the District Court to direct the jury to accept the 
findings of the Spoliation Order as conclusive.  For their part, Welch and WTS moved for 
the Court to exclude the testimony of Koskie, the MHANJ employee.  The Court denied 
Lexpath’s motion, stating that it chose the least severe sanction by crafting an instruction 
would tell the jury a “paragraph or two about spoliation” and instruct that the jury may 
consider the lost information unfavorable to Welch.  A. 3353.  However, the Court 
granted Welch’s motion, explaining that Koskie’s testimony was irrelevant and would 
confuse the jury because Lexpath had not alleged any damages with regard to MHANJ.  
 At trial, during Lexpath’s opening argument, counsel told the jury that “Mr. Welch 
destroyed evidence in the form of 53,000 computer files that were on a Lexpath laptop . . 
. . His Honor has already ruled on that and will instruct you that you may presume that 
the evidence he deleted would have been unfavorable to him.”  A. 3389.  After opening 
arguments, the Court told the parties that it was “worried” that “the jury could have been 
left with the impression that the Court had made a decision on the facts” and that 
Lexpath’s statement “gave the inference to the jury that . . . they should take this fact as 
being true.”  A. 3411–12.   
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 The Court then issued a corrective instruction that: 
While the Court issued an order on spoliation, I did not make any final 
decisions about the facts, I just said that the information could be admitted 
into evidence.  So, it’s your job during the course of this trial to determine 
the weight and credibility of that testimony that you’ll hear, and those types 
of issues are within your province to decide.  So whatever you heard, I 




 Later on at trial, Lexpath called its forensic expert to testify about the laptop, the 
deleted files, and the CCleaner program.  Before closing arguments, the Court told 
counsel that it “had doubts as to whether or not a presumption was warranted” after 
hearing the evidence, and that it would charge spoliation but not a presumption in 
Lexpath’s favor.  A. 4078–79.  After some discussion, Lexpath’s counsel requested that 
the Court “take the spoliation charge out of the instructions,” A. 4081, which the Court 
did.   
 The jury found in favor of Welch and WTS on all counts, and determined that 
Lexpath had asserted its misappropriation of trade secrets claim in bad faith.  At no time 
did Lexpath move for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
50.  This appeal followed.   
 
 
II.  DISCUSSION  
On appeal, Lexpath assigns numerous errors to the District Court before and at 
trial.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 & 1367, and our 
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jurisdiction flows from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review each of Lexpath’s contentions in 
turn. 
A. Spoliation Instruction 
 We review the District Court’s denial of an adverse inference instruction for abuse 
of discretion.  McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Gen. Grp., Inc., 869 F.3d 246, 268 
(3d Cir. 2017).  “[W]here there is evidence that one party has destroyed or altered 
evidence, the opposing party can obtain a ‘“spoliation inference,” that the destroyed 
evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the offending party.’”  Id. 
(quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994)).     
Lexpath contends that the District Court abused its discretion by telling counsel it 
would not give a spoliation instruction, reversing its previous ruling that it would instruct 
the jury that “they may presume that the lost information [on Welch’s laptop] was 
unfavorable to Defendants.”  A. 1724.  After hearing the evidence, the Court told the 
parties that a presumption was not warranted, citing a lack of testimony as to whether 
Lexpath was actually missing any pricing documents that could have been found on the 
laptop, and Lexpath’s expert’s testimony that the deleted files could have been for 
personal use.  The Court told the parties that it would “charge[] spoliation, but I don’t 
charge a presumption in favor of the plaintiff.”  A. 4079.2  In response, Lexpath’s counsel 
asked the Court to “take the spoliation charge out of the instructions.”  A. 4081.  
                                              
2 Although the details of the proposed charge are not in the record, we presume the Court 
meant that it would tell the jury that it was up to them to determine whether or not 
spoliation had occurred.   
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We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion when the Court:  repeatedly 
made clear to the parties before and at trial that “it was up to the jury to find whether 
spoliation in fact occurred,” A. 4081, denied Lexpath’s pretrial motion to direct the jury 
to accept as conclusive the facts in the Spoliation Order, and then—at Lexpath’s 
request—declined to give a spoliation instruction.  
To begin, a district court’s findings of fact in deciding a pretrial motion cannot 
foreclose a jury from making its own factual findings.  Cf. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 
494 U.S. 545, 552–53 (1990); Berry v. United States, 312 U.S.  450, 453 (1941) (“[Rule 
50(b)] has not taken away from juries and given to judges any part of the exclusive power 
of juries to weigh evidence and determine contested issues of fact—a jury being the 
constitutional tribunal provided for trying facts in courts of law.” (footnote omitted)).3  
The Spoliation Order merely stated that “the Court will instruct the jury that they may 
presume that the lost information was unfavorable to Defendants.”  A. 1724.11.  This, the 
least-harsh form of spoliation instruction, would not have required the jury to presume 
the lost evidence was unfavorable.  Nor did the Order state that the Court would instruct 
the jury that spoliation had, as a matter of law, occurred.  Lexpath correctly notes that it 
did not assert, and therefore did not need to prove, a standalone tortious spoliation of 
evidence claim.  But that did not absolve it of its burden to show the jury that Welch had 
control over the evidence and that he “intentionally or fraudulently lost or destroyed” it, 
                                              
3 We have not yet spoken to the proper “division of fact-finding” labor, Nucor Corp. v. 
Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 202 (D.S.C. 2008), between judges and juries when issuing a 
spoliation sanction.  We need not resolve this question on this appeal, however, because 
we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to decline to give an adverse inference 
charge under these circumstances. 
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Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983), if it wanted to rely on 
spoliation to prove its substantive claims.  Otherwise, as the Court had never indicated 
that it would instruct the jury that as a matter of law, spoliation had occurred, there would 
be no facts for the negative presumption to work on.  Indeed, the Court repeatedly 
reminded the parties before trial that “the facts should be tried by the jury.”  A. 3354. 
Nor could Lexpath have reasonably been surprised by the Court’s ruling that it 
would not instruct the jury that Welch had deleted evidence, when the Court admonished 
Lexpath’s counsel for telling the jury in its opening statement that “Mr. Welch destroyed 
evidence . . .  His honor has already ruled on that.”  A. 3389.  The Court immediately told 
the parties its concern that “the jury could have been left with the impression that the 
Court had made a decision on the facts,” A. 3411, and issued a corrective instruction to 
the effect that the Spoliation Order did not remove the factual issue of spoliation from the 
jury.  Additionally, it was within the Court’s discretion to revisit its prior ruling upon 
hearing the evidence presented at trial.  See In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust 
Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] trial judge has the discretion to reconsider 
an issue and should exercise that discretion whenever it appears that a previous ruling, 
even if unambiguous, might lead to an unjust result.” (quoting Swietlowich v. Cty. of 
Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir. 1979))).   
 We identify no abuse of discretion in declining, at the party’s request, to 
give an instruction after so warning the parties about the jury’s province to find 
facts regarding Welch’s use of the laptop.  




Lexpath next argues that the jury’s verdict should be vacated because it was 
against the weight of the evidence and because Welch’s counsel “admitted liability” in 
closing.  We need not address the merits of the sufficiency of the evidence claim because 
Lexpath failed to follow the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  A party urging a new trial on appeal must make a post-verdict Rule 50 motion.  
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 402–03 (2006).  
Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that a party who does not file a Rule 50 motion for 
judgment as a matter of law at the end of the evidence is not thereafter entitled to have 
judgment entered in its favor notwithstanding an adverse verdict on the ground that there 
is insufficient evidence to support the verdict.”  Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 
364 (3d Cir. 1999).  Lexpath’s failure to make a Rule 50 motion precludes it from 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.   
Alternatively, Lexpath contends that Welch’s counsel admitted that Welch 
breached his duty of loyalty.  At closing, his counsel stated that, by providing a rate sheet 
to Liberty two days before resigning from Lexpath, Welch did something “that he wasn’t 
supposed to do.” A. 4118.  Standing alone, however, this concession does not mean that 
the jury was irrational in finding for Welch on the breach of duty of loyalty claim.  See 
Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1168 (N.J. 2001) (stating that when 
deciding a breach of duty of loyalty, the jury must consider “the employee’s level of trust 
and confidence, the existence of an anti-competition contractual provision, and the 
egregiousness of the conduct”).   
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 C.  Statements of Reganato and Feldman 
 
Lexpath also assigns error to the District Court’s ruling excluding statements by 
Donald Lusardi to Peter Reganato and Allan Feldman as inadmissible “double hearsay.” 
We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and its legal 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence de novo.  United States v. Repak, 852 
F.3d 230, 240 (3d Cir. 2017).  We generally review a district court’s denial of a motion 
for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but our review is plenary “if the court’s denial 
was based upon the interpretation and application of a legal precept.”  Koshatka v. Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  Breaking down the facts into their 
most basic form, we identify no abuse of discretion where the District Court denied 
admission of testimony from two individuals that a third, non-testifying individual told 
them that a fourth individual made disparaging remarks about the plaintiff.   
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).  At 
trial, Lexpath sought to introduce testimony from Reganato and Feldman that Lusardi 
told them that Welch made negative statements about Lexpath.  His statements (repeated 
by Lusardi to Reganato and Feldman) were allegedly to the effect that Lexpath was 
incapable of handling the accounts following Welch’s departure.  The District Court 
determined this was double hearsay, which could only be admitted if each statement fit 
into a hearsay exception.  Fed. R. Evid. 805.  The Court concluded that there was no 
relevant exception for the second layer of hearsay (Lusardi’s statements to Reganato and 
Feldman).  The Court then denied Lexpath’s motion to reconsider. 
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Even assuming, as Lexpath avers, that Welch’s statements are not hearsay because 
they were not being offered to prove their truth (that Lexpath could not handle the 
accounts without Welch), but rather for the fact that Welch made the statements to 
Lusardi at all, that only takes care of the first level of hearsay.  Lusardi’s statements to 
Reganato and Feldman would still need to fit under a relevant exception to be admissible.   
According to Lexpath, Lusardi’s statements show his state of mind and motive 
when he decided to move Liberty’s business—specifically, that he credited Welch’s 
negative remarks about Lexpath and thought he had no choice but to go with Welch.  See 
Lexpath Br. at 32–33 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(3)).  But the conversations were not 
contemporaneous with the decision to move Liberty’s business.  Feldman said his 
conversation with Lusardi happened at least three months later, and Reganato’s 
conversation occurred at least a week later.  Admitting these statements would therefore 
have run afoul of the Rule 803’s prohibition on “including a statement of memory or 
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”  Fed. R. Evid.  803(3).  Likewise, 
Lexpath’s contention that the statements should have been admitted under Rule 807(a)’s 
residual exception is without merit because they lack the exceptional indicia of 
trustworthiness required. 
D.  Summary Judgment  
 
Our review of the District Court’s denial of summary judgment is plenary, and we 
apply the same test as the District Court did.  Koshatka, 762 F.2d at 333.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
13 
 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Shuker v. 
Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018).  
Lexpath moved for summary judgment on its CFAA and CROA claims multiple 
times.  The District Court denied the motions, but did not issue a memorandum in either 
instance.  On appeal, Lexpath contends the District Court “erred in failing to recognize 
that the determinations made in the Spoliation Order constituted law of the case.”  
Lexpath Br. at 36.  Lexpath argues that summary judgment was appropriate because 
Welch violated both the CFAA and CROA when he knowingly ran CCleaner on the 
laptop after the end of his employment with Lexpath.  For the following reasons, we 
disagree.   
  1.  Summary Judgment on CFAA Claim 
The District Court properly denied Lexpath’s motion for summary judgment with 
respect to its CFAA claim.  The CFAA permits civil recovery against a defendant who, 
inter alia, “[i]ntentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer,” 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), or who “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command, and as a result, intentionally causes damages without 
authorization to a protected computer,” id. § 1030(a)(5)(A). 
Lexpath argues that summary judgment was appropriate because Welch violated 
the CFAA when he knowingly ran CCleaner on the laptop after the end of his 
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employment. 4  Lexpath relies on the facts established in the Spoliation Order to show 
that Welch was not authorized to use the laptop.  However, as explained above, such 
findings do not require a court to usurp the jury’s role as the trier of fact, and Lexpath has 
pointed us to no authority suggesting otherwise.  Moreover, the District Court determined 
that whether Welch had permission to access and clean the laptop was ultimately an issue 
of fact for the jury.  For instance, after Welch left Lexpath, Tuohy asked for his continued 
assistance regarding business matters, which arguably authorized Welch to use the 
laptop.  Given that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Welch’s use 
was authorized, the District Court properly denied Lexpath’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
  2.  Summary Judgment on New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act 
Claim 
 
The District Court properly denied Lexpath’s motion for summary judgment as to 
its claim under CROA. To recover under CROA, a plaintiff must show he was “damaged 
in business or property by the defendant’s violation of the act.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:28A-
3.  We have said that a plaintiff must demonstrate damages under CROA to sustain a 
claim.  In Re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 278 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Expert fees paid in furtherance of litigation are considered litigation costs rather than 
                                              
4 Lexpath also asserts that its expenditures to support litigation claims against Welch can 
qualify as “loss” under § 1030(e)(11).  While we have not spoken to whether litigation 
costs are compensable losses under the statute, we need not reach that question here 
because there was ample basis for the District Court to deny Lexpath’s motion for 




damages.  See Kowaleski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 815, 819 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990).   
Lexpath contends that summary judgment was appropriate because Welch violated 
CROA when he knowingly ran CCleaner on the laptop after the end of his employment.  
Lexpath bears the burden to demonstrate a violation.  See P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. 
Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005).  
However, instead of showing that Welch copied or misappropriated confidential 
information, Lexpath asked the Court to adopt as final, for summary judgment purposes, 
its findings of fact in the Spoliation Order.  Its state-law motion therefore suffers the 
same infirmity as its CFAA summary judgment motion, namely, that it asked the Court to 
rely on factual findings from the Spoliation Order and take that issue away from the jury.  
Moreover, Tuohy, in his deposition, stated that Welch gained his knowledge of 
confidential information through his employment at Lexpath, and so there was no need 
for Welch to take information from the laptop.  Finally, Lexpath’s expenses were 
incurred to support its litigation claims, which are considered litigation costs rather than 
damages, and are not compensable losses under CROA. See Kowaleski, 569 A.2d at 819 
n.4.  Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the District Court’s denial of summary 
judgment. 
E.  Koskie Testimony 
We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  
McMunn, 869 F.3d at 268.  Before trial, the District Court granted Welch’s motion in 
limine to exclude testimony from Katie Koskie of MHANJ, finding that it was irrelevant 
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and would confuse the jury because MHANJ remained a client of Lexpath’s.  Lexpath 
sought to call Koskie to testify to “disparaging statements made by Welch regarding 
Lexpath and its employees.”  A. 2910–11.   
On appeal, Lexpath contends the exclusion was in error because Koskie’s 
testimony was relevant to whether Welch was dissatisfied with his job at Lexpath and 
whether he was beginning to compete with them.  Perhaps.  But, as the District Court 
recognized, it is more likely that the jury would have interpreted it as propensity evidence 
or been unduly confused by its content.  This is especially so given that the testimony did 
not purport to offer relevant evidence of solicitation of MHANJ, let alone Liberty or 
EIMC.  The Court appropriately exercised its discretion to exclude evidence, of limited 
relevance, on the basis that it was offered to establish a party’s propensity to commit bad 
acts.  See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).5  
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and orders. 
 
                                              
5 Because we find no basis to remand, we need not address Lexpath’s recusal argument. 
